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Do network capabilities improve corporate financial performance? Evidence 




Purpose: This study bridges the gap in the literature on supply chain finance (SCF) by 
exploring the relationship between network capabilities and corporate financial 
performance (CFP) in financial supply chains (FSCs). 
Methodology: We adopt panel data regression to analyse the joint investment 
activities among 1359 manufacturing firms and 289 financial service providers in 
China to explore how network capabilities, both network power and network centrality, 
improve CFP in the FSCs. 
Findings: Under the FSCs environments, network centrality (i.e., eigenvector 
centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality) raises CFP (ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q), and network power (node degree, clustering coefficient) also improves 
CFP. However, node strength from the network power stream has a negative effect on 
Tobin’s Q, indicating that when the partner of a firm has an extremely strong influence 
in FSCs, this weakens the bargaining ability and flexibility of focal firm, thus reducing 
its long-term financial performance. 
Originality: This study answers the call for more empirical research on SCF to 
provide a broader sample set of financial supply chain management (FSCM) from 
joint investment activities. This is one of the earliest studies to shed light on a new 
perspective—how network capabilities improve CFP in the FSCs. 
Practical implications: The joint investment activities among industrial chain 
partners and financial service providers help managers understand the advanced 
financing solutions generated by internal and external network organisations as well as 
be aware of network capabilities impact CFP in FSCs. 
Keywords: Supply chain finance solutions; Financial supply chain; Corporate 
financial performance; Network organisation; Investment activities 
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Article classification: Research paper 
1 Introduction 
The attention paid to supply chain finance (SCF) has increased in practice and 
academia since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Wetzel and Hofmann, 2019). 
Taken as a whole, the perspectives of SCF are mainly drawn from two aspects: the 
‘financial-oriented’ perspective and the ‘supply chain-oriented’ or ‘buyer-driven’ 
perspective (Caniato et al., 2016). The ‘financial-oriented’ perspective regards SCF as 
a set of financing solutions, financing from payables or receivables, which can be 
divided into pre-shipment, in-transit, and post-shipment financing; and financial 
institutions are vital in this perspective (Moretto et al., 2019). The ‘supply 
chain-oriented’ perspective regards SCF as a set of solutions that optimises inventory 
in the supply chain to increase cash availability or reduce financing costs; again, 
financial institutions are important but not mandatory (Caniato et al., 2019). 
Therefore, no matter from the perspective of ‘financial-oriented’ or ‘supply 
chain-oriented’, financial institutions and financing solutions are essential parts of 
SCF solutions. 
 
Financial flows and advanced financing technologies in SCF solutions have received 
increased attention in recent years, especially in the process of digital transformation 
(Wetzel and Hofmann, 2019). With the development of digital transformation 
technologies, many advanced supply chain-based and industrial chain-based financing 
solutions have emerged in supply chain management, thereby promoting the rapid 
development of ‘financial-oriented’ SCF. In other words, the financial supply chain 
(FSC) is becoming more important in SCF solutions (Xu et al., 2018). Table 1 
summarises some typical modes of financing the FSC. These typical financing 
solutions promote close connections among suppliers, customers, and service 
providers (i.e. financial institutions) using multiple financing modes to integrate 
material, financial, and information flows in FSC practices (Hofmann et al., 2019). 
Therefore, studies of financial flows and financial services in the digital 




Insert Table 1 here 
In response to the increasing importance of financial flows and financial services, 
20–25% of enterprises already adopt advanced technologies to manage their supply 
chain and industrial chain partners (Gornall and Strebulaev, 2018). In this study, these 
methods are considered to be the FSC, namely, defined herein as, optimised planning, 
managing, and controlling of the financial flows among supply chain, industrial chain 
and financial service partners to efficiently facilitate material and information flows in 
the process of supply chain management based on a certain product (Wuttke et al., 
2013). In contrast to SCF methods, which typically follow the principle of optimising 
the cash flow across industrial chain, supply chain, and financial service participants, 
the FSC emphasises these methods form product-based financial technologies and 
financing schemes. Therefore, in FSCs, close collaboration is required between the 
financial and supply chain managers in an enterpsrise, and extensive collaboration is 
also encouraged beyond the firm’s borders with service providers (e.g. financial 
institutions), suppliers, customers, and upstream and downstream enterprises. Our 
research sheds light on the SCF literature by investigating how to handle the constraint 
of financial liquidity using the typical FSC ways of joint investment activities among 
industrial chain and financial service partners. 
 
We focus on joint investment activities among industrial chain partners, which is one 
type of financing modes in the FSCs, which have become increasingly popular in the 
resource-intensive manufacturing industry and differ from joint venture activities, a 
well-researched financing solution. A joint venture is a business entity created by two 
or more parties that involves the creation of a new separate organisational entity 
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). However, joint investment activities do not necessarily 
involve the creation of a separate organisational entity, which allows for the flexible 
use of financing instruments among partners for an enterprise to obtain financial flows 
(e.g. equity investment, securities transaction, entrusted investment, and portfolio 
investment) among supply chain and industrial chain partners (Chang et al., 2012; 
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Chakuu et al., 2019). To a certain extent, joint ventures constitute a specific type of 
joint investment activities. In the context of joint investment activities among 
industrial chain and financial service partners, the advanced financing instruments are 
the financial flows, the materials among industrial chain levels are the material flows, 
and the financing information both from financial flows and from material flows are 
the information flows, allowing us to provide a robust snapshot of the FSCs. 
 
Previous research has explored the relationship between network capabilities and 
corporate financial performance (CFP) in the SCF solutions based on the theories of 
resource dependence and network organisation (Hillman et al., 2009; Carnovale et al., 
2019). Since enterprises should continuously transform themselves by reshaping 
resource configurations to establish their advantage, Hillman et al. (2009) suggest that 
network capabilities as an organisational resource affect the operation strategies of the 
enterprise based on resource dependence theory. This theory usually describes the 
organisational behaviour among suppliers, customers, and focal enterprises in the 
network environment based on interdependence effects and restricted effects 
(Carnovale et al., 2019). This research adopts resource dependence theory (i.e. 
resource abilities and resource channels) to capture the network capabilities (i.e. 
network power and network centrality) of enterprises to access organisational 
resources. Specifically, two themes of network capabilities that may impact CFP 
emerge: (1) network power, which identifies the abilities of enterprises in the FSCs, 
and (2) network centrality, which quantifies the channels of enterprises in FSCs. 
 
To explore how network capabilities improve CFP in FSCs, our research is the first to 
construct network structural characteristics by considering an important but 
understudied financing solution of joint investment activities among industrial chain 
and financial service partners. We choose joint investment activities among enterprises 
in the computers, communications, and other electronics equipment Manufacturing 
Industry in China (termed MI hereafter) because of its vast production networks, and 
resource-intensive manufacturing processes, and multiple industrial chain-based 
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financing solutions. We also consider joint investment activities between the MI and 
Financial Industry (FI) because the financial flows provided by financial institutions 
can effectively promote material flows and information flows. Therefore, in this study, 
joint investment activities mainly comprise of vertical financing among MI industrial 
chain partners and horizontal financing between MI and FI partners. We then construct 
the FSC networks for each year using joint investment data, generating symmetric 
matrices for each year between 2012 and 2017 and obtaining a dynamic panel dataset 
of FSC network structures over these six years. We finally estimate the potential 
effects using panel data regression to test several theoretical hypotheses. 
 
Our research contributes to the SCF literature in at least threefold. First, we explore an 
important but understudied financing solution of SCF, namely, joint investment 
activities among industrial chain and financial service partners in FSCs. Rather than 
only focusing on vertical investment in a single industrial chain in the vein of 
Carnovale et al. (2019), we also investigate the horizontal investment between MI and 
FI partners, boarding the financing channels both vertically and horizontally. Second, 
in FSCs, our research is the first to provide a nuanced understanding of network 
capabilities and theoretically explain how they improve CFP. Our findings add to the 
FSC literature by evidencing that network centrality (i.e. eigenvector centrality (EC), 
closeness centrality (CL), and betweenness centrality (BC)) and network power (node 
degree (ND), node strength (NS) and the clustering coefficient (CC)) positively 
contribute to CFP. Third, the operation strategies and financing solutions evolved from 
our findings would be helpful for SCF stakeholders, especially from the perspective of 
FSC management. For instance, the financial and supply chain managers in a firm 
should understand that product-based financing solutions are required; Further, they 
should realise the importance of network relationships rather than solely focusing on 
linear financing relationships to broaden financing channels both horizontally and 
vertically; they should be aware that of the network capabilities have a significant 




The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related works on SFC, 
the FSC, resource dependence theory, and network organisation theory and connects 
these with CFP in the FSCs. Section 3 presents theoretical analysis and proposes 
research hypotheses. Section 4 describes empirical study using panel data regression 
models and discuses several interesting findings. Section 5 discusses the theoretical 
and managerial implications. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Research background 
2.1.1 SCF and the FSC 
Scholars have defined SCF from multiple perspectives. One of the most cited 
definitions is that by Vanpoucke (2009), stating that SCF covers ‘optimizing the 
inter-financial resources as well as the integration of financing processes with 
customers, suppliers, and service providers, to increase the value of all participating 
enterprises’. In this study, SCF covers three dimensions: the supply chain, finance, and 
technology. First, the supply chain dimension emphasises the importance of 
collaboration with supply chain and industrial chain participants (Caniato et al., 2016). 
Second, the financial dimension emphasises the use of advanced financing tools for 
financial flows to improve cash flow management (Wuttke et al., 2013). Third, the 
technology dimension emphasises the adoption of information technology (IT) to 
promote the application of SCF solutions (Gelsomino et al., 2016). Thus, SCF is a 
supply chain-based or industrial chain-based financing solution using advanced IT 
and financing instruments to improve the financial flow management of participating 
enterprises, emphasising collaboration across a product-based supply chain and 
industrial chain partners, such as focal firms, service providers (e.g. financial 
institutions), suppliers, and customers (Caniato et al., 2016; Lam et al., 2019). 
 
Owing to the emergence of multiple participants and tiers in SCF solutions, the 
traditional linear relationships among participants should been transformed into a 
network organisation and the network capabilities of participants should be considered. 
Seiler et al. (2020) explore how the network position of the enterprise in an extended 
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supply chain network affects its financial performance, arguing that the performance 
measurement tools in SCF solutions should consider the network position. Martin and 
Hofmann (2017) argue that financial service providers are compulsory actors in SCF 
solutions that can better provide the resources of organisational members and add 
value to organisational members in SCF practices. Ali et al. (2019) indicate that the 
strong tie of firms significantly enhances firm performance and suggest that firms 
should share more information in their supply chain network to allow partners to 
improve their operational capabilities. Carnovale et al. (2019) argue that firms can 
take advantage of network characteristics to resource access, which can increase CFP. 
 
The links between the FSC and SCF mainly rest on the financial and the supply chain 
perspectives. On the side of the financial perspective, financial flows are one of the 
main pillars of the FSC. Studies of FSC discuss how to plan, manage, and control the 
financial flows among supply chain and industrial chain participants to improve CFP. 
Accordingly, one of the core elements of SCF is to manage product, information and 
financial flows in a coordinated manner, making the FSC an important part of SCF. On 
the side of the supply chain perspective, the management of financial flows is a vital 
aspect of supply chain management, particularly in the trade finance and diverse 
financing processes. The typical financing modes in FSC practices such as supply 
chain contracts, platform financing, trade credit, buyer credit, and banking transactions 
have also received attention in SCF. Hence, both the FSC and SCF belong to the scope 
of supply chain management, but the FSC focuses on coordinating financial flows and 
financial transactions through advanced financial technology and financial services. 
Hence, it is an important part of SCF that focuses on financial flows and advanced 
financial services to promote the effective integration of material, information, and 
financial flows among supply chain and industrial chain participants (Gupta and Dutta, 
2011). 
 
Studies of FSC mainly examine the following five aspects. First, the definition of the 
FSC. According to Blackman et al. (2013), that FSC comprises network organisations 
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that coordinate financial transactions via financial processes and enable goods flows 
and financial services between the trading partners in a product supply chain. Second, 
the interaction between the FSC and product supply chain, suggesting it is a reciprocal 
relationship between the product and financial processes within a supply chain or 
industrial chain (Wuttke et al., 2013). Third, the business ecosystem of FSC, which is 
involved in the coordination of the financial transactions among upstream enterprises, 
downstream enterprises, and their financial partners (Gupta and Dutta, 2011). Fourth, 
the integration of information flows through IT, such as the integration of transactional 
data from within the enterprise, e-commerce systems, industrial chain partners, and 
financial service providers (Fairchild, 2005). Finally, FSC performance, such as 
financial performance, non-financial performance, operational performance, and 
strategic performance (Xu et al., 2018). 
 
The FSC has important characteristics in the digital era. Advanced and diversified 
financial instruments and financing schemes should be encouraged, because 
digitisation and innovative financing solutions are becoming increasingly important, 
and new financial instruments and advanced financing solutions provide an 
unprecedented opportunity for firms to increase their financial management capability 
and operating efficiency, especially in resource-intensive manufacturing processes. 
Further, organisational characterises should be considered because the FSC involves 
many stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, customers, financial institutions, platform providers, 
supply chain participants, and industrial chain participants). Hence, organisational 
characterises should be considered when seeking FSC practices. Further, financial 
network structure should be considered because the business ecosystem of the FSC 
comprises multiple tiers among supply chain and industrial chain partners. As such, 
the FSC is changing from a single linear relationship to a network organisation. These 
characteristics are understudied, and little research has discussed the role of 
organisational characteristics, namely, network capabilities, in FSCs, especially based 
on a real trading set. We thus aim to address this important gap by investigating the 




2.1.2 Network organisation theory 
Prior researches have defined a network organisation as a combination of relationships 
that a business maintains with its partners to access information, resources, and 
markets (Gulati, 1999). Network organisation theory was developed by Chang et al. 
(2012), who argue that ‘firms do not operate in isolation’, emphasising the importance 
of interaction among enterprises throughout the business ecosystem. In supply chain 
management, this ecosystem has developed as a supply chain network. Specifically, 
supply chain networks mainly emphasise network power and network centrality to 
identify the connectedness or cohesiveness of the enterprises in the network (Wuttke et 
al., 2013). Therefore, in FSCs, network structures of enterprises are generated through 
multiple tiers among supply chain partners, industrial chain partners, and financial 
service providers through specific activities (e.g. asset investment, joint investment, 
complementary resources), and these partners are also connected with their own 
network environments. 
 
Many scholars have studied supply chain management from the perspective of 
network organisation theory. For example, Zaheer and Bell (2005) investigate the 
supply chain network based on the views of organisational strategy, arguing that 
enterprises with superior network structures can better exploit their internal 
capabilities to improve financial performance. Chang et al. (2012) develop strategies 
for the supply chain network in the following areas: relation-specific assets, 
knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resources and capabilities, and network 
position. Song et al. (2019) investigate the role of the firm’s position in enhancing 
access to resources throughout the entire network, emphasising the importance of 
utilising network resources in the supply chain. Therefore, existing research indicates 
that the network organisation, as a kind of resource, provides a theoretical basis for 




2.1.3 Resource dependence theory 
As one of the main ways to access resources, network capabilities are thus considered 
to be an important source of organisational resources, thereby affecting CFP based on 
resource dependence theory (Basole et al., 2018). Resource dependence theory, a 
fundamental perspective for understanding organisational cooperation and other 
cooperative relationships (e.g. joint investment activities, strategic alliances, 
buyer–supplier relationships), is mainly composed of two basic factors: resource 
interdependence and resource constraints. Resource interdependence indicates that the 
normal operation of a firm relies on the resources provided by other firms, and this 
resource interdependence occurs in the network organisation when a firm needs 
external resources to implement an activity, as shown by Pfeffer and Nowak (1976). 
Resource constraints refer to the effects of interdependence, namely, a firm is faced 
with constraints based on how interdependent the it is in relation to other network 
participants, and is bound by conditions as a result (Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
Many scholars of supply chain management have studied how network capabilities 
affect firm’s operating performance based on resource dependence theory. For 
example, Vanpoucke et al. (2009) argue that the degree of dependence of focal firms 
and supply chain partners is positively related to the power of those partners to achieve 
goals, but negatively related to resource availability. Hillman et al. (2009) find that 
firms acquire network resources through cooperation with other firms, indicating that 
small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain more benefits than larger firms. Ma et 
al. (2020) argue that for firms that operate in a network organisation, their operating 
efficiency depends on resource dependence and resource constraints. In general, the 
operating capacities of an enterprise in a network organisation depend on its power to 
take actions and the centrality of the network structure (Yang et al., 2019). Therefore, 
existing research indicates that resource dependence theory provides a theoretical basis 




2.2  Research gap 
Considering the digital transformation technologies empowering SCF solutions, 
advanced financing solutions and IT are becoming more important. As an important 
branch of SCF, the FSC focuses on financial flows and financial services to design, 
manage, and control the financial transactions among supply chain partners, industrial 
chain partners, and service providers to facilitate material flows and information flows 
in the product-based supply chain and industrial chain. Therefore, this research focuses 
on a classic financing mode in FSCs, namely, joint investment activities among 
industrial chain partners and financial services providers, which have become 
increasingly popular in vast production networks and differ from other well-researched 
financing solutions in the manufacturing industry. Although previous studies of the 
FSC mainly focuses on its definition, the interaction between FSC and product supply 
chains, business ecosystems, the integration of information flows through IT, and its 
performance, the FSC as a financial network organisation that coordinates financial 
flows with trading partners in a product-based supply chain and industrial chain and 
the role of its network structure on CFP have been ignored, especially studies using 
Chinese empirical data. Therefore, juxtaposed on the theories of network organisation 
and resource dependence, our research explores the extent to which network 
capabilities affect CFP in FSCs. It is the first study to construct two kinds of network 
characteristics, namely, network power and network centrality, to estimate the 
potential effect on CFP in terms of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
and Tobin’s Q (TBQ). Our research thus extends the FSC literature on how network 
capabilities improve CFP by examining joint investment activities among industrial 
chain partners and financial service providers. 
3 Research hypotheses 
3.1 Hypothesis framework 
In the previous section, we discussed the related but juxtaposed theories of network 
organisation and resource dependence to understand the FSC through the financing 
modes of joint investment activities among industrial chain partners and financial 
service providers. In this study, the product-based financing modes are constructed by 
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horizontal investment among the MI and financial service providers and by vertical 
investment among industrial chain levels. Hence, this study extends the scope of FSC 
practices to the network organisation environment, suggesting that network 
capabilities of enterprises should be considered when they seek to improve their 
financial performance. Consequently, to explore the role that the network capabilities 
play in enhancing CFP, we should obtain variables for a firm’s network structural 
characteristics and CFP. Inspired by Chen (2018), this study uses ROA, ROE and TBQ 
to measure CFP. The rationales for using these variables is straightforward: ROA 
indicates the efficiency of a firm’s management in generating income from resources; 
ROE measures the efficiency of a firm in generating earnings from shareholder capital; 
and TBQ measures the efficiency between market value and working capital (Kaldor, 
1966). For network capabilities in FSCs, this research focuses on two types of network 
structures. The first is network power, which measures the influence of a firm in the 
network and posits that the connectedness is inherent and governs the mutual 
behaviour between network participants (Dahl, 1957); here ND, NS, and CC are used 
as agents. The second is network centrality, which identifies the importance of a firm 
in the whole network and considers the cohesiveness (i.e. density) of an enterprise 
throughout that network (Borgatti, 2005); here, EC, CL, and BC are used. In addition, 
the integration effect between network power and network centrality is crucial to CFP. 
Table 2 represents the definitions for these variables. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Network power and CFP 
The concept of network power has been long studied in the supply chain management 
literatures (Chakuu et al., 2019). Under the FSCs, the network power of a firm is 
derived from the attractiveness of its own resources and freedom to obtain financial 
resources from other organisations. Thus, power is the capability of the firm to create 
financing relationships among industrial chain partners and financial partners, to 
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broaden its ability to obtain financial resources in the FSCs (Provan et al., 1980). 
Specifically, in FSCs, network power is mainly composed of the amount of contact 
with other enterprises, weight of transactions with other partners, and embeddedness 
with other partners in the FSC network organisation (Kim et al., 2011). 
 
Therefore, this study expects a positive correlation between network power and 
corporate revenue, ROA. When an enterprise with a higher level degree enters the 
FSCs, it can flexibly choose its FSC partners because it has more enterprises from 
which to select, which may increase its revenue. Enterprises that improve network 
power can better manage their suppliers and financial service providers, which may 
significantly improve their ability to obtain financial resources (Olsen et al., 2014). 
Similarly, as embeddedness increases, the bargaining power of an enterprise also rises, 
thereby reducing its purchasing cost of the enterprise and increasing the revenue of 
enterprises in FCS practices. Therefore, we make predictions based on the following 
hypotheses:  
H1: Network power has a positive effect on ROA. 
H1a: Network power (ND) has a positive effect on ROA. 
H1b: Network power (NS) has a positive effect on ROA. 
H1c: Network power (CC) has a positive effect on ROA. 
 
In addition to increasing corporate revenue, we also expect network power to have a 
positive impact on corporate profits, ROE. According to the theory of resource 
dependence, firms seek to increase control through various types of organisational 
resources, so as to improve their profit performance (Hillman et al., 2009). Therefore, 
in FSC practices, we expect firms with high network power, to have higher profit as 
well as revenue. Therefore, we make predictions based on the following hypotheses: 
H2: Network power has a positive effect on ROE. 
H2a: Network power (ND) has a positive effect on ROE. 
H2b: Network power (NS) has a positive effect on ROE. 




In addition, increasing the network power of enterprises can improve their access to 
resources and enhance their financing ability in the FSCs. These advantages improve 
not only their short-term financial performance in terms of revenue and profit, but also 
their long-term performance in terms of TBQ (Drees and Heugens, 2013). Therefore, 
with an increase in network power, firms can access more financial resources, which 
improves their management of financial flows in FSC practices. Therefore, we predict 
that long-term performance (TBQ) also increases. Hence, 
H3: Network power has a positive effect on TBQ. 
H3a: Network power (ND) has a positive effect on TBQ. 
H3b: Network power (NS) has a positive effect on TBQ. 
H3c: Network power (CC) has a positive effect on TBQ. 
 
3.2.2 Network centrality and CFP 
Although network power is crucial in explaining CFP in the FSCs, network centrality 
should also be explored in detail. In FSCs, network centrality can be regarded as the 
basis for promoting the channels of organisational resources, making it crucial for 
explaining CFP (Pugliese et al., 2014). Specifically, in FSCs, network centrality is 
mainly composed of the shortest path to reach two other firms, the shortest distance to 
reach all other firms, and the prestige score for a firm in the whole network 
organisation (Kim et al., 2011). We also expect that network centrality can improve 
ROA. To achieve the best revenue performance, enterprises should design the 
resources of the entire FSC, so that those with a higher concentration can access more 
of the available resources and generate more diverse channels, all of which help 
improve ROA (Caniato et al., 2016). Thus, we make predictions based on the 
following hypotheses: 
H4: Network centrality has a positive effect on ROA. 
H4a: Network centrality (BC) has a positive effect on ROA. 
H4b: Network centrality (EC) has a positive effect on ROA. 




Next, we expect that the increase in network centrality has a positive impact on 
corporate profits, ROE. In FSCs, enterprises that increase their network centrality also 
increase access to resources and reduce dependence on a single firm, which directly 
affects CFP such as corporate profits. In addition, enterprises that increase network 
centrality through diverse channels create opportunities for cooperation between 
finance partners both from industrial chains and from financial institutions, which can 
directly increase ROE (Kale and Shahrur, 2007). Thus, we make predictions based on 
the following hypotheses: 
H5: Network centrality has a positive effect on ROE. 
H5a: Network centrality (BC) has a positive effect on ROE. 
H5b: Network centrality (EC) has a positive effect on ROE. 
H5c: Network centrality (CL) has a positive effect on ROE. 
 
Network centrality is considered to be a key organisational resource, as it can directly 
result in competitive advantage for enterprises in FSCs. As improving network 
centrality is directly related to the diversity of organisational connections among 
financial service and industrial chain partners, it directly influences TBQ performance 
(Gupta and Dutta, 2011). Generally, these competitive advantages improve not only 
financial performance in terms of revenue and profits, but also the performance of 
TBQ. Therefore, we make predictions based on the following hypotheses: 
H6: Network centrality has a positive effect on TBQ. 
H6a: Network centrality (BC) has a positive effect on TBQ. 
H6b: Network centrality (EC) has a positive effect on TBQ. 
H6c: Network centrality (CL) has a positive effect on TBQ. 
 
3.2.3 Total effect of both network power and network centrality on CFP 
In addition to considering the structural characteristics that form both network power 
and network centrality, we also consider their total effect in FSC practices. The 
network power (connectedness) of enterprises facilitates the access to resources and 
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the network centrality (cohesiveness) of enterprises represents the channels for 
accessing to those resources; therefore, both abilities and channels can be used to 
increase CFP in FSC practices (Lechner and Leyronas, 2007). For the firm, improving 
financial performance depends on connectedness (abilities), but this cannot be 
separated from cohesiveness (channels) when designing FSC solutions (Hearnshaw 
and Wilson, 2013). Carnovale et al. (2016) argue that the stronger connectedness and 
the closer cohesiveness, the stronger is the firm’s capacity to access finance resources, 
which raises CFP. Therefore, we make predictions based on the following hypotheses: 
H7: Both network power and network centrality affect CFP. 
H7a: Both network power and network centrality affect ROA. 
H7b: Both network power and network centrality affect ROE. 
H7c: Both network power and network centrality affect TBQ. 
 
4 Empirical study 
4.1 Sample selection and data collection 
The main research question focuses on the role of network capabilities in improving 
CFP in FSCs. To answer this, we source our variables from three data sources: (1) the 
measures of network capabilities in FSCs mainly comprise ND, NS, CC, EC, CL, and 
BC; (2) the measures of CFP comprise ROA, ROE, and TBQ; (3) and the key control 
variables are enterprise scale (ES), the asset/liability ratio (AL), the fixed assets ratio 
(RA), firm age (AGE), ownership concentration (OC), board size (BS), and regional 
macro-economy (RE), following by Lu and Shang (2017) and Lee et al. (2017). 
 
To describe the network structural characteristics in FSCs, the CSMAR database 
(http://www.gtarsc.com) is used. Specifically, we select the listed firms with joint 
investment activities from the MI and the FI in the A-share market. The CSMAR 
database provides transaction reports on joint investments between partners, and these 
are mainly comprise equity investments, securities transactions, entrusted investments, 
and portfolio investments. We choose joint investment activities among MI industrial 
chain partners because of the vast production networks and resource-intensive 
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manufacturing processes that generate many industrial chain-based financing solutions. 
We also consider joint investment activities between the MI and FI because the 
financial flows provided by financial institutions can promote material flows and 
information flows in the FSCs, especially in the resource-intensive manufacturing 
industry. Joint investment activities between two financial institutions are not 
considered in this study because they lack the basic material flows in FSCs. The joint 
investment network constructed in this study is different from that of Carnovale et al. 
(2019), who only choose the automotive industry because of its vast production 
networks. However, we add financial institutions into the joint investment networks to 
broaden the financing solutions for the FSC, both vertically and horizontally, to 
integrate financial, material and information flows extensively into the vast production 
networks and intensive manufacturing processes. 
 
Next, to obtain the dynamic panel dataset for the network structural characteristics in 
FSCs, this study first generates symmetric matrices for each year in 2012–2017 as 
follows. Each matrix is comprised of n  rows and n  columns (i.e. a matrix of size 
n n , hence the symmetric label) where each firm is represented in a distinct row and 
column of the matrix. In the original sample, there are 240 240  in 2012, 258 258  in 
2013, 258 258  in 2014, 269 269  in 2015, 294 294  in 2016, and 329 329  in 2017. 
Therefore, there are 1648 firms (1359 MI firms and 289 FI firms), generating six 
adjacency matrices. We label these matrices tA , where t  represents the year. Each 
element, ija , of the matrix (for year t ) is assigned a value of either zero or one (thus 
it is binary in construction), where a value of one indicates firms i  and j  (in year 
t ), and the joint investment amount as a weight of the link between firms i  and j . 
Thus, we have a dynamic panel dataset of the network structure over six years. 
 
Next, to gather information on CFP, this study uses the Wind database 
(http://www.wind.com.cn/), which provides financial information disclosed by firms. 
We cross-reference this dataset against the firms in the joint investment network using 
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their ticker symbols, to obtain the complete data. Collectively, the matrices referenced 
above define the network structure of the FSC, and thus all the network-related 
independent variables are calculated, for each year, using these matrices. After 
calculating all the network variables, removing observations that lacked complete 
financial information, and adding the relevant control variables, this study eventually 
retains 703 observations with complete information. 
 
4.2 Operationalisation of the variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
Three dependent variables used in this study are ROA, ROE, and TBQ. The first 
dependent variable, ROA, shows the percentage of how profitable a firm’s assets are 
in generating revenue (Burton et al., 2002). The second dependent variable is ROE, 
which is a metric of how firms use equity to generate profits (Arditti, 1967). Finally, 
we examine corporate TBQ, which is the relationship between the market value of 
shares and the capital employed by corporations (Kaldor, 1966). For specific 
mathematical formulae refer to Table 2 and the descriptive statistics of dependent 
variables in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
To operationalise the network capabilities of enterprises in the FSC environments, we 
use network power and network centrality separately. The first group of network 
measures captures the network power of one enterprise: (1) the number of links to 
other firms (ND); (2) the weights of the links to other firms (NS); and (3) the 
embeddedness of the links to other firms (CC). The second group of network measures 
captures network centrality: (1) the shortest distance between two other firms (BC); (2) 
the shortest distance to reach all other firms (CL); and (3) the prestige score in the 
whole network (EC). For specific mathematical formulae refer to Table 2, and the 




4.2.3 Control variables 
To capture any unobserved heterogeneity in the relationship between network 
capabilities and CFP, we consider some key control variables. First, existing research 
has shown that the ES, namely, the logarithmic transformation of a firm’s total assets, 
reflects all resources easily convertible into cash. We also control for any experiential 
effects by including AGE, the firm’s OC (the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder), the firm’s BS (number of directors), RE (the logarithmic transformation 
of the annual GDP of the province in which the firm is registered), and AL. In addition, 
since all the dependent variables are financial and time-varying, we expect the 
possibility of significant autocorrelation and endogeneity. Thus, in all the empirical 
models, the one-year lags of the dependent variable are included as independent 
variables ( 1t  ). Finally, the descriptive statistics of the control variables in Table 3, 
and Table 4 shows the correlation results. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
4.3 Models and results 
4.3.1 Existence of network power 
To capture any unobserved heterogeneity in the relationship between network 
capabilities and CFP in FSCs, this study makes these variables the control variables 
and their respective effects are tested in Models 1–3 (the baseline models). To check 
the potential effect of network power on CFP, we use ROA, ROE and TBQ as the 
independent variables and create the panel data regression modes in Models 4–6: 
 , ,i t i i i tROA u v  λz  (1) 
 , ,i t i i i tROE u v  λz  (2) 
 , ,i t i i i tTBQ u v  λz  (3) 
 , 1 , 2 , 3 , ,i t i t i t i t i i i tROA ND NS CC u v       λz  (4) 
 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,i t i t i t i t i i i tROE ND NS CC u v       λz  (5) 
 , 7 , 8 , 9 , ,i t i t i t i t i i i tTBQ ND NS CC u v       λz , (6) 
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where the subscript i  denotes the ith firm, and the subscript t  denotes time; iz  is 
the set of control variables including ES, AL, RA, AGE, OC, BS, and RE; iu  is the 
set of individual-specific and time-invariant effects that are fixed over time; and ,i tv  
is a time-varying random component. The independent variables are as follows: ,i tROA  
stands for the ROA of the ith firm at time t ; ,i tROE  stands for the ROE of the i
th firm 
at time t ; and ,i tTBQ  stands for the Tobin’s Q of the i
th firm at time t . The dependent 
variables of network power are as follows: ,i tND  is the ND of the i
th firm at time t ; 
,i tNS  is the NS of the i
th firm at time t ; and ,i tCC  is the CC of the i
th firm at time t . 
We then use the random effect estimator to test our hypotheses and adopt Lam (2018) 
approach to address the possible autocorrelation of errors in our estimation. The 
regression results of the potential effect of network power are shown in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
For the baseline models, the regression results of Eqs. (1)–(3) are presented in 
columns 2–4 of Table 5, and due to the limited space, we do not analyse these results 
in detail. The regression results of the potential influence of network power on CFP 
are presented in columns 5–7 of Table 5. First, hypothesis 1 (a–c) dealt specifically 
with the effect of network power on ROA, and the corresponding regression results of 
Eq. (4) are presented in column 5 of Table 5: the coefficient of ND is positive but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level, which does not support H1a; the coefficient of 
NS is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which supports H1b; and the 
coefficient of CC is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which 
supports H1c; Finally, the goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (4) is 0.1770, which is greater 
than the fitting index of Eq. (1) at 0.0990, indicating that network power does increase 
ROA overall. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (a–c) dealt with the impact of network power on ROE, and the 
corresponding regression results of Eq. (5) are presented in column 6 of Table 5. The 
coefficient of ND is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level; thus, H2a is 
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supported. The coefficient of NS is positive but not statistically significant at the level 
of 10%, which does not support H2b. Finally, the coefficient of CC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, which supports H2c. The goodness-of-fit 
index of Eq. (5) is 0.1060, which is greater than the goodness-of-fit of Eq. (2) at 
0.0650, indicating that network power is also increase ROE on the whole. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 (a–c) dealt with the impact of network power on TBQ, and the 
corresponding regression results of Eq. (6) are presented in column 7 of Table 5. The 
coefficient of ND is negative but not statistically significant at the 10% level, which 
does not support H3a; the coefficient of NS is negative but statistically significant at 
the 5% level, which does not support H3b; and the coefficient of CC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which supports H3c. Finally, the 
goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (6) is 0.1410, which is greater than the goodness-of-fit 
index of Eq. (3) at 0.1010, indicating that network power increases TBQ overall. 
 
4.3.2 Existence of network centrality 
To check the potential effect of network centrality on firms’ financial performance, we 
use BC, EC, and CL as the dependent variables and create the panel data regression 
models in Models 7–9: 
 , 10 , 11 , 12 , ,i t i t i t i t i i i tROA BC EC CL u v       λz  (7) 
 , 13 , 14 , 15 , ,i t i t i t i t i i i tROE BC EC CL u v       λz  (8) 
 , 16 , 17 , 18 , ,i t i t i t i t i i i tTBQ BC EC CL u v       λz , (9) 
where the subscript i  denotes the ith firm and the subscript t  denotes time. The 
dependent variables are ,i tROA , ,i tROE , and ,i tTBQ  and the independent variables are 
as follows: ,i tBC  is the BC of the i
th firm at time t , ,i tEC  is the EC of the i
th firm at 
time t , and ,i tCL  is the CL of the i
th firm at time t . The set of control variables, iz , 
includes ES, AL, RA, AGE, OC, BS and RE. iu  is the set of individual-specific and 
time-invariant effects that are fixed over time and ,i tv  is a time-varying random 
component. We then use the random effect estimator to test our hypotheses and adopt 
Lam (2018) approach to address the possible autocorrelation of errors in our 
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estimation. The regression results for check the potential effect of network centrality 
are shown in Table 6. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
The regression results of the potential influence of network centrality on CFP are 
presented in columns 5–7 of Table 6. First, Hypothesis 4 (a–c) dealt with the impact of 
network centrality on ROA (see column 5). The coefficient of BC is positive but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level, which does not support H4a; the coefficient of 
EC is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which supports H4b; and the 
coefficient of CL is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, which 
supports H4c; finally, the goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (7) is 0.1227, which is greater 
than the goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (1) at 0.0990, indicating that network centrality 
increase ROA overall. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (a–c) dealt with the impact of network centrality on ROE, and the 
corresponding regression results of Eq. (8) are presented in column 6 of Table 6. The 
coefficient of BC is negative and not statistically significant at the 10% level, which 
does not support H5a; the coefficient of EC is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level, which supports H5b; and the coefficient of CL is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, which supports H5c. Finally, the 
goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (8) is 0.1240, which is greater than the goodness-of-fit 
index of Eq. (2) at 0.0650, indicating that network centrality increases ROE overall. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 6 (a–c) dealt with the impact of network centrality on TBQ, and 
the corresponding regression results of Eq. (9) are presented in column 7 of Table 6. 
The coefficient of BC is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, which 
supports H6a; the coefficient of EC is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, which supports H6b; and the coefficient of CL is positive but not statistically 
significant at the 10% level, which does not support H6c. Finally, the goodness-of-fit 
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index of Eq. (9) is 0.1304, which is greater than the goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (3) at 
0.1010, indicating that network centrality increases corporate TBQ on the whole. 
 
4.3.3 Total existence of both network power and network centrality 
To check the total effect from both network power and network centrality on CFP in 
FSCs, we use ND, NS, CC, BC, EC, and CL as the dependent variables and create the 
panel data regression models in Models 10–12: 
 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i i tROA ND NS CC BC EC CL u v             λz  (10) 
 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i i tROE ND NS CC BC EC CL u v             λz  (11) 
 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i i tTBQ ND NS CC BC EC CL u v             λz , (12) 
where the subscript i  denotes the ith firm and the subscript t  denotes time. The 
dependent variables are ,i tROA , ,i tROE  and ,i tTBQ ; the independent variables are 
,i tND , ,i tNS , ,i tCC , ,i tBC , ,i tEC , ,i tCL ; iz  is the set of control variables that includes 
ES, AL, RA, AGE, OC, BS and RE; iu  is the set of individual-specific and 
time-invariant effects that are fixed over time, and ,i tv  is a time-varying random 
component. We again use the random effect estimator to test our hypotheses and adopt 
Lam (2018) approach to address the possible autocorrelation of errors in our 
estimation. The regression results of the potential effect of network centrality are 
shown in Table 7. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
The regression results of the effect of both network power and network centrality on 
CFP are presented in columns 5–7 of Table 7. First, Hypothesis 7a dealt with the 
juxtaposition of network power and network centrality against ROA, and the 
corresponding regression results of Eq. (10) are presented in column 5 of Table 7. The 
coefficient of ND is positive but not statistically significant at the 10% level, the 
coefficient of NS is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, the coefficient 
of CC is positive but not statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficient of BC 
is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficient of EC is 
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positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, and the coefficient CL is positive 
but not statistically significant at the 10% level; consequently, H7a is partly supported. 
The goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (10) is 0.1815, which is greater than the 
goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (1) at 0.0990, indicating that the juxtaposition of network 
power and network centrality is significantly helpful for increasing ROA overall. 
 
Hypothesis 7b dealt with the effect of both network power and network centrality on 
ROE, and the corresponding regression results of Eq. (11) are presented in column 6 of 
Table 7. The coefficient of ND is positive but not statistically significant at the 10% 
level, the coefficient of NS is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, the 
coefficient of CC is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, the 
coefficient of BC is negative but not statistically significant at the 10% level, the 
coefficient of EC is negative but not statistically significant at the 10% level, and the 
coefficient of CL is positive but not statistically significant at the 10% level; 
consequently, H7b is partly supported. The goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (11) is 0.1362, 
which is greater than the goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (2) at 0.0650, indicating that the 
integration of network power and network centrality is significantly helpful for 
increasing ROE on the whole. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 7c dealt with the effect of the juxtaposition of network power and 
network centrality on TBQ, and the corresponding regression results of Eq. (12) are 
presented in column 7 of Table 7. The coefficient of ND is negative but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficient of NS is positive but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficient of CC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, the coefficient of BC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficient of EC is negative but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level, and the coefficient of CL is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level; thus, H7c is partly supported. The 
goodness-of-fit index of Eq. (12) is 0.1704, which is greater than the goodness-of-fit 
index of Eq. (3) at 0.1010, indicating that the juxtaposition of network power and 
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network centrality is significantly helpful for increasing corporate TBQ on the whole. 
A summary of the results of all the hypotheses is presented in Table 8.  
 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
4.3.4 Robustness check 
To test the robustness of the above results on how network capabilities improve CFP in 
the FSCs, we consider the baseline models in Models 1–3 as scenario S0; for scenario 
S1, we add the network structural characteristics including network power and 
network centrality into Models 10–12. We then adopt the Diebold and Mariano (2002) 
test to compare S1 with S0 for ROA, ROE, and TBQ, respectively. The parameter 
‘alternative’ for the R function ‘dm.test’ is set to be ‘greater’. For this multiple testing, 
we let (1) (2) ( )0 0 0, , ,
m
H H H  be a family of null hypotheses indicating that the 
performance levels of S0 and S1 are equivalent. The alternative hypothesis ( )1
i
H  
indicates that S1 is statistically superior to S0 in each scenario for 1,2, , .i m  We 
then use a Bootstrap sampling strategy to obtain 422 ( 703 3 5 ) sub-observations in 
each time period, where 50m   (Xu et al., 2019). Finally, we obtain the p-values 
across the scenarios using the adjusted R-squared; the p-value calculated using the 
Diebold–Mariano test for ROA is 0.031, the p-value for ROE is 0.044, and the p-value 
for TBQ is 0.039. The results of all the Diebold–Mariano tests are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, we reject the null hypotheses and accept the 
alternative hypothesis in all the scenarios. In summary, under FSCs, the conclusion 
that network capabilities are an important resource for improving CFP is supported. 
 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
First, our research is the first to provide a nuanced understanding of how network 
capabilities improve CFP and theoretically explain why network capabilities as 
organisational resources affect the CFP in FSCs. Although previous research on SCF 
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has discussed how network structural characteristics affect CFP, (e.g. Carnovale et al. 
(2019) consider EC and network density, and Ali et al. (2019) consider strong ties and 
bridge ties in supply chain networks), our research is the first to expand the analysis 
into FSCs, an important branch of SCF. Moreover, compared with previous SCF 
studies based on the network organisation, such as Seiler et al. (2020), our research 
offers a broader view of the SCF network organisation by detailed evidencing that 
network structural characteristics affect CFP based on both network centrality (EC, CL, 
and BC) and network power (ND, NS, and CC). Therefore, our research adds to the 
FSC literature, an importance branch of SCF, by finding that enterprises with strong 
network capabilities can obtain better financial resources in FSCs. 
 
Second, our research boards the financing channels using joint investment activities 
(both vertically and horizontally), which is an important but understudied financing 
solution of the FSC. We explore joint investment activities among MI industrial chain 
participants because of its vast production networks and multitude of industrial 
chain-based financing schemes are generated. Rather than focusing on vertical 
investment in a single industrial chain akin to Carnovale et al. (2019), we also 
investigate horizontal investment among MI and FI partners because the financial 
flows provided by financial institutions can promote material flows and information 
flows in the resource-intensive manufacturing industry, such as MI. In addition, little 
research has considered such financing solutions in SCF (i.e. studies of the FSC from 
the network organisation perspective); hence, this financing scheme also contributes to 
the financing solutions of SCF. Although a large number of pervious researchers have 
discussed the financing solutions of SCF, studies are usually based on a single supply 
chain as Xu et al. (2018), a single industrial chain as Carnovale et al. (2019), or a 
single financial service providers in Ma et al. (2020). By contrast, our research 
considers two types of financing channels at the same time: vertical financing from 
industrial chain participants and horizontal financing from financial service providers. 
 
Third, this study responds to the calls by Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013) and Xu et al. 
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(2018) for more empirical studies of SCF that can provide a broader sample set of FSC 
solutions based on real joint investment activities among Chinese MI and FI 
enterprises. Our research sample includes both manufacturing enterprises and financial 
institutions in FSCs as well as considers their industrial chain cooperation based on 
financial flows. This is different from previous case studies of the FSC. For example, 
Blackman et al. (2013) detailed discuss the global FSC strategy for a specific 
enterprise, Motorola. On the contrary, our research uses a large trading sample of 1648 
Chinese firms (1359 MI firms and 289 FI firms), providing evidence that the network 
structural characteristics impact CFP in the FSCs. Moreover, since numerous 
enterprises are seeking for FSC solutions globally, this particular empirical study form 
Mainland China has implications for emerging economies. 
 
5.2 Managerial implications 
With the digital transformation empowering SCF, advanced IT and diversified 
financial instruments provide new opportunities for SCF solutions, especially for its 
importance branch FSC. This study is the first to explore joint investment activities 
among MI industrial chain participants and its financial service providers in FSCs. 
Differing from traditional financial solutions that typically follow the principle of 
optimising the financial flows of a single firm, we extends this scope into all industrial 
chain, supply chain and financial service participants using advanced IT and 
diversified financial instruments. Therefore, first, we strongly recommend close 
collaboration between the financial managers and supply chain managers in an 
enterprise to efficiently facilitate material flows and financial flows in a product-based 
supply chain and industrial chain. At the same time, extensive collaboration is also 
encouraged beyond the borders of the enterprise, namely, with service providers (e.g. 
financial institutions), upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises, by designing 
the financial risk of the business ecosystem. 
 
Second, managers should realise the importance of network relationships rather than 
solely focusing on linear characterises in the FSCs, to broaden financing channels for 
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FSC solutions and improve CFP. They should also be aware that network capabilities 
significantly impact CFP in FSCs. Our research indicates that network relationships 
can broaden the financing channels for resource-intensive manufacturing enterprises 
and that network capabilities can improve CFP. Therefore, managers should consider 
how first-degree supply base connections and extended networks affect financial 
performance. To maximise CFP, managers should strive towards a robust and diverse 
supply base (i.e. a larger network structure) where their organisational resources play a 
central role. 
 
Finally, managers should establish this awareness about the duality of organisational 
resources in the FSC solutions, namely, the interdependence and the constraints of 
resources. When managers seek SCF or/and FSC solutions, they should realise the 
importance of diversified financing channels because large suppliers, consumers, and 
financial institutions can bring network advantages for focal firms, but the risk of 
resource constraints also exists. We find that network structural characteristics 
positively impact CFP in most cases, but that NS has a direct negative effect on TBQ 
because one partner has an extremely strong influence in FSCs, this weakens the 
bargaining ability and flexibility of the focal firm in FSCs, thus lowering long-term 
CFP, such as TBQ. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This is one of the earliest papers to explore how network capabilities improve CFP in 
the context of FSCs, and our findings have significant implications for both FSC and 
SCF solutions. In this study, we consider FSC solutions by selecting MI and FI firms 
with joint investment activities listed on the A-share market, which provides a robust 
snapshot of FSCs (the integration among financial, material and information flows). 
We measure network capabilities by using network power to describe connectedness, 
and network centrality to capture cohesiveness, to explore how network structural 
characterises improve CFP. The empirical results indicate that network capabilities can 
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effectively improve CFP in FSCs overall, but that NS has a direct negative effect on 
TBQ. These findings and insights are important for both academics and practitioners. 
 
With the digital transformation empowering SCF solutions, our study contributes to 
the literature on FSC management in at least threefold. (1) Joint investment activities 
as a financing solution have been expanded into the FSCs. Considering the vast 
production networks and multiple industrial chain-based financing schemes in the 
resource-intensive manufacturing industry, we first choose vertical investment among 
MI industrial chain participants as well as investigate horizontal investment among MI 
and FI partners because the financial flows provided by financial institutions can 
promote material flows and information flows for MI enterprises. Therefore, our 
research broadens financing solutions both vertically and horizontally, which provides 
a robust snapshot of FSCs. (2) Network capabilities can improve CFP by providing 
empirical evidence on a new real trading sample in the FSCs. The empirical results 
show that network capabilities have a positive and significant impact on CFP in most 
cases, but that NS has a direct negative effect on TBQ. Third, theoretical contributions 
and practical insights into SCF solutions are presented in detail. By juxtaposing the 
theories of network organisation and resource dependence, this study presents specific 
insights for FSC participants. Taken together, it puts forward a new perspective on 
managing network power and centrality in FSCs to improve CFP. 
 
Our research has several limitations. While we discuss the unobserved heterogeneity 
in the relationship between network structure and CFP in the FSCs, further research 
should explore the various mechanisms through which these works. Future research 
could also test the marginal effects of these structural characteristics on corporate 
financial performance within FSC environments (Caniato et al., 2018). Additionally, 
considering that digitisation can promote the exactly match of online and offline 
transaction data, other digitised transaction data should be explored in FSC solutions 
to reduce investment risk for banks using digital assets. Finally, the way in which 
network power and network centrality were measured in this study differs from those 
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Table 1 The typical financing modes in FSC practices. 
Practices Explanations Sources 
Bank credit Financing provided from a bank involving working capital and 
pre-export finance. 
Caniato et al. 
(2016) 
Buyer credit 
Financing provided to finance suppliers (e.g. advance payments 
or deposits). 
Thangam (2012) 
Trade credit The credit extended (i.e., a short-term delay in payments) by a 




Buying enterprise obtains credit from suppliers without formally 
offering security or involving third-party security. 




A financial arrangement where a corporation facilitates early 
payment of its trade credit obligations to suppliers. 




Retailer share the market uncertainty with its supplier to optimal 
quantity for joint profit maximization by using diverse 
coordination contracts (i.e., buybacks, quantity discounts, 
revenue-sharing, quantity flexibility contracts, and capacity 
reservation contracts). 




Financing provided from financial institutions, supply chain and 
industrial chain partners by equity (i.e., equity investments, 
securities transactions, entrusted investments, and portfolio 
investments). 




Buyer provides loan to supplier to finance work in progress. 




Portals with a key role of a large company, offering its suppliers 








Table 2 List of network metrics 
Metric Definition Formula 
ND ND is the number of links that firm  has with other firms  
in the network. The adjacent matrix  when a link exists 
between firms  and , and  otherwise. It captures the 
network power of a firm from the perspective of link number. 
 
NS NS is the sum of all neighbouring link weights in the network. 
 is the number of neighbours of firm , and  is the 
weight from firm  to . NS reflects the network power of a 
firm from the perspective of weight. 
 
CC CC is the portion of actual links ( ) between the firm ( ) 
within its neighbourhoods divided by the maximal possible links 
. The CC reflects the network power of a firm from 
the embeddedness with its neighbours. 
 
BC BC indicates that firm  is located on the shortest path 
connecting other firms in the network.  is the sum of the 
number of all the shortest paths between firms  and , and 
 is the number of the shortest paths that pass through firm 
. BC reflects the centrality by quantifying the number of times 
a firm acts as a bridge along the shortest distance between two 
other firms. 
 
CL CL is the inverse of the average shortest path length from one 
firm to all other firms in the network. CL reflects the shortest 
distance to reach all other firms. 
 
EC EC is a measure of the influence of a firm in a network.  
is the set of the neighbours of firm ,  is a constant, and 
 is the adjacency matrix. EC reflects the centrality of a 
firm according to prestige scores, such as Google’s PageRank. 
 
ROA ROA is a metric that indicates how profitable a firm’s assets are 
in generating revenue. 
 
ROE ROE is a metric of how well a firm utilises its equity to generate 
profits. 
 
TBQ TBQ is the relation of the market value of shares to the capital 
employed by corporations, where  is net consumption out of 
capital,  is the savings of workers, g is the growth rate,  
is income,  is capital,  is savings out of capital and  is 







Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
Variable N Min Max Mean Skewness SD 
ROA 702 -3.994 0.393 0.030 -21.473 0.163 
ROE 702 -46.517 1.255 0.001 -26.206 1.765 
TBQ 702 0.805 126.952 2.608 19.843 5.270 
ND 702 1 71 5.859 6.922 5.496 
NS 702 2 25.927 3.872 4.791 2.280 
CC 702 0 0.099 0.040 0.357 0.028 
EC 702 0 0.438 0.027 3.721 0.065 
CL 702 0 130 23.353 5.312 17.304 
BC 702 0 10 4.001 5.256 1270.426 
ES 702 17.388 30.893 22.970 1.516 2.370 
AL 702 0.020 0.950 0.454 0.346 0.250 
RA 702 0.001 0.790 0.149 1.032 0.135 
AGE 702 2 27 10.454 0.552 6.547 
OC 702 5.280 88.550 31.787 1.015 14.240 
BS 702 5.000 18 10.595 -0.383 0.608 
RE 702 8.640 11.485 10.596 0.608 -0.383 
Note(s): the values of observations (N), the minimum (Min) and maximum (Max), the mean (Mean), as well as 





Table 4 Correlation results 
Variable ROA ROE TBQ DE NS CC EC CL BC ES AL RA AGE OC BS RE 
ROA 1                
ROE 0.753* 1               
TBQ 0.231 0.321 1              
ND 0.009 0.023 0.057 1             
NS -0.022 0.009 0.059 0.943 1            
CC 0.059 -0.024 0.033 0.048 0.055 1           
EC 0.001 0.013 0.057 0.479 0.550 0.019 1          
CL 0.021 0.013 0.013 -0.060 -0.001 0.100 -0.065 1         
BC 0.006 0.021 0.051 0.733 0.746 -0.065 0.516 -0.062 1        
ES 0.030* 0.098 -0.236 0.516 0.566 0.038 0.416 -0.041 0.400 1       
AL -0.179 -0.067 -0.084 0.339* 0.382 0.129 0.217 0.039 0.240 0.753* 1      
RA 0.006 0.029* -0.016 -0.254 -0.281 0.012 -0.193 -0.006 -0.179 -0.394 -0.269 1     
AGE -0.059 -0.056 0.064 0.033 0.038 0.075 -0.052 -0.006 0.004 0.069 0.145* -0.050 1    
OC 0.095 0.057 -0.061* 0.050 0.093 0.061 0.139 0.035 0.072 0.155* 0.031 -0.118 -0.143 1   
BS -0.062 -0.017 -0.068 0.453 0.485 0.174 0.257 -0.055 0.297 0.687 0.543 -0.290 -0.015 -0.009 1  
RE 0.048 0.029 -0.012* -0.066 -0.097 -0.276 -0.066 0.022 -0.051 -0.199 -0.164 0.207 -0.215 -0.096 -0.177 1 






Table 5 Main estimation results for network power 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Constants -0.6366*** -6.8676*** 28.0264*** -0.6922*** -7.6829*** 13.7038*** 
Control 
variables 
      
ES 0.0321*** 0.3511** -1.2552** 0.03487*** 0.3848*** -1.4291*** 
AL -0.2921** -2.2112** 4.1799* -0.2977** -5.669*** 4.7926** 
RA 0.0355** 1.0703* -4.8934 0.0283 0.9744* -4.3699** 
AGE -0.0003* -0.0099 0.0551 -0.0003 -0.0097 0.0552* 
OC 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0054 0.0005 0.0002 0.0076 
BS -0.0079* -0.0994** 0.3581** -0.0070* -0.0986** 0.3726** 
RE 0.0109 0.0613 -0.1627* 0.0122 0.0898 -0.3959 
Independent 
variables 
      
ND    0.0030 0.0420* -0.0299 
NS    0.0120** 0.1466 -0.2861* 
CC    0.0899** 2.4269* 7.7079*** 
Fit indices       
Adjusted R2 0.0990 0.0650 0.1010 0.1770 0.1060 0.1410 






Table 6 Main estimation results for network centrality 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
Constants -0.6366*** -6.8676*** 28.0264*** -0.7077*** -7.6171*** 10.6734*** 
Control 
variables 
      
ES 0.0321*** 0.3511** -1.2552** 0.0356*** 0.3887*** -1.3834*** 
AL -0.2921** -2.2112** 4.1799* -0.3074*** -2.3528*** 4.6388*** 
RA 0.0355** 1.0703* -4.8934 0.0287 1.0167* -4.7235** 
AGE -0.0003* -0.0099 0.0551 -0.0004 -0.0110 0.0581* 
OC 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0054 0.0005 0.0001 0.0047 
BS -0.0079* -0.0994** 0.3581** -0.0079* -0.1006** 0.3588*** 
RE 0.0109 0.0613 -0.1627* 0.0110 0.06377 -0.1758 
Independent 
variables 
   
   
BC    0.1922 -2.0161 5.5569* 
EC    0.0004** 0.0023** 0.0613*** 
CL    0.0010* 0.0090* 0.0041 
Fit indices       
Adjusted R2 0.0990 0.0650 0.1010 0.1227 0.1240 0.1304 






Table 7 Main estimation results for total existence of both network power and network centrality 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) 
Constants -0.6366*** -6.8676*** 28.0264*** -0.7218*** -8.0217*** 9.7353*** 
Control 
variables 
      
ES 0.0321*** 0.3511** -1.2552** 0.0366** 0.4030* -1.4813*** 
AL -0.2921** -2.2112** 4.1799* -0.3084*** -2.3927*** 5.0476** 
RA 0.0355** 1.0703* -4.8934 0.0228 0.9416* -4.2883 
AGE -0.0003* -0.0099 0.0551 -0.0003 -0.0107 0.0583* 
OC 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0054 0.0005 0.0002 0.0073 
BS -0.0079* -0.0994** 0.3581** -0.0075* -0.1022** 0.3842*** 
RE 0.0109 0.0613 -0.1627* 0.0118 0.0878 -0.3962 
Independent 
variables 
      
ND    0.0031 0.0395 -0.0140 
NS    0.0117** 0.1272** 0.2224 
CC    0.0816 2.4145* 8.0864** 
BC    0.1503* -1.6599 5.1207* 
EC    0.0005* 0.0030* -0.0057 
CL    0.0003 0.0002 -0.0100** 
Fit indices       
Adjusted R2 0.0990 0.0650 0.1010 0.1815 0.1362 0.1704 






Table 8 Summary of findings 
Hypotheses Results 
H1a: Network power (ND) has a positive effect on ROA. Not supported 
H1b: Network power (NS) has a positive effect on ROA. Supported 
H1c: Network power (CC) has a positive effect on ROA. Supported 
H2a: Network power (ND) has a positive effect on ROE. Supported 
H2b: Network power (NS) has a positive effect on ROE. Not supported 
H2c: Network power (CC) has a positive effect on ROE. Supported 
H3a: Network power (ND) has a positive effect on TBQ. Not supported 
H3b: Network power (NS) has a positive effect on TBQ. Not supported 
H3c: Network power (CC) has a positive effect on TBQ. Supported 
H4a: Network centrality (BC) has a positive effect on ROA. Not supported 
H4b: Network centrality (EC) has a positive effect on ROA. Supported 
H4c: Network centrality (CL) has a positive effect on ROA. Supported 
H5a: Network centrality (BC) has a positive effect on ROE. Not supported 
H5b: Network centrality (EC) has a positive effect on ROE. Supported 
H5c: Network centrality (CL) has a positive effect on ROE. Supported 
H6a: Network centrality (BC) has a positive effect on TBQ. Supported 
H6b: Network centrality (EC) has a positive effect on TBQ. Supported 
H6c: Network centrality (CL) has a positive effect on TBQ. Not supported 
H7a: Both network power and centrality have a positive effect on ROA. Partly supported 
H7b: Both network power and centrality have a positive effect on ROE. Partly supported 
H7c: Both network power and centrality have a positive effect on TBQ. Partly supported 
 
 
